1. Facts. The present sentences puts an end to the litigation that arose more than five years ago between Telecinco and La Sexta due to the alleged unauthorized use of audiovisual sequences in the latter's programs.
The events date back to the beginning of 2006, when the television network La Sexta began to broadcast the program “I know what you did”, a television format characterized by the use of fragments of programs from other networks, - mainly heartfelt programs. -, for humorous, sarcastic, and even ridiculing purposes.
Telecinco exercised its intellectual property rights before the Courts, obtaining favorable rulings both in the first instance and on appeal. Both bodies agreed in stating that the broadcast of this program constituted an activity that violated the rights of Telecinco that was not protected by any limits on intellectual property.
Faced with such pronouncements, the defendant files an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court for procedural and cassation infringement.
2. Pronouncements. The sole reason for the extraordinary appeal for procedural violation is the violation of article 219.3 LEC. The first instance ruling, later confirmed by the Court, condemned La Sexta to pay compensation for damages, deferring its quantification to a subsequent declaratory procedure. According to the appellant, this ruling violates the provisions of section 3 of article 219 of the LEC, which would exclude the possibility of deferring the quantification of damages to the execution of the sentence when that is not the only ruling sought in the request.
Well, according to the High Court, an interpretation in accordance with the spirit of the Law involves understanding that such a deferral is possible when the rest of the claims that are accumulated to the compensation must be understood to have been implicitly exercised, such is the fundamental and prior claim that classify the conduct as illegal. Otherwise, excessive rigor in the application of the provision in question would have the consequence of depriving the injured parties of compensation, seriously affecting their right to effective judicial protection.
Regarding the appeal, the ruling of the TS is aimed at clarifying whether or not the conduct of the defendants has a place within the limit of citations and reviews and press magazines included in article 32.1 TRLPI. In this sense, the Court affirms that the use of foreign sequences in the defendant's program is not covered by such limit, since its main requirements are not met.
First of all, it is an entertainment program, without a teaching, research or, at least, cultural purpose. Furthermore, the use of other people's images is not carried out “to the extent justified by the purpose”, but rather it is a recurring and indiscriminate practice. Nor does it constitute a review or a press review, since the program has no informative purpose. It cannot even be considered that it is an activity framed within the phenomenon known as “press clipping” (art. 32.1 in fine), given that this genre is exclusive to the written press. In short, the defendant's conduct constitutes an infringement of the plaintiff's rights of reproduction and communication.
3. Comment. This ruling is doubly interesting, both with regard to its pronouncements on procedural matters and with regard to substantive aspects.
The possibility of deferring the quantification of damages to the execution of the sentence is something that had already been previously announced by the High Court, among others, by the ruling of January 16, 2012. However, with this pronouncement, it is clear that the principle that sentences must be liquid must be qualified on occasions (essentially when, for reasons beyond the control of the injured parties, it is not possible to quantify the compensation in the course of the process) in order to of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection.
As far as the ruling on the merits is concerned, the interpretation of the limit of article 32.1 TRLPI, in addition to being adjusted to the literal wording of the Law, is certainly in accordance with the purpose and spirit of the limit system established by the legislator. Indeed, one of the reasons supporting the Court's decision is that the conduct of the defendant, from the moment in which it pursues greater audience success in the same market in which it competes with the plaintiff's programs, is likely to harm the normal exploitation of the works used.
It is worth asking, however, what the Court's decision would have been if the appellant's conduct had been analyzed from the point of view of parody...
