Today we talk with Carlos MoranPartner lawyer specializing in litigation industrial and intellectual property and unfair competition in Elzaburu, regarding a recent Supreme Court ruling that has generated interest in the field of Copyright and co-authorship in artists' workshops. Carlos then answers a series of questions that help clarify the practical scope of this resolution and the implications it may have for artists, collaborators, and professionals in the sector.
Context
The Supreme Court's Civil Chamber judgment of September 30, 2025, addresses, practically for the first time, the issue of determining the authorship of works of art created within the context of an artist's studio. However, the reality is that the appeal process had very little room for maneuver, and the Supreme Court essentially upheld the appellate court's judgment issued by Section 28 of the Provincial Court of Madrid on March 21, 2021. The case before the Supreme Court was already hampered by the evidence presented at first instance and by the strength of the appellate court's ruling. The Supreme Court adds little. The appeal judgment accepts the facts established as proven in light of the evidence presented and the legal pronouncements of the Provincial Court. The limitations inherent in the appeal process did the rest.
Supreme Court criteria for differentiating between technical assistance and contributed creativity
Rather than criteria, the Supreme Court has taken into account the facts that emerge from the evidence presented, namely:
- The plaintiff was an artist with proven professional qualifications.
- The salary he received for his collaboration with the defendant was considerably high.
- The plaintiff worked alone in the studio for many hours a day, and the defendant used to travel quite a lot.
- Under these conditions it seems logical to think that the plaintiff, when putting the defendant's ideas into the painting, enjoyed creative freedom to also express her own personality.
The Supreme Court ruling recalls at several points that, for the Provincial Court, whose criteria on the facts and evidence must be respected, the tasks performed by the plaintiff were “highly relevant” and not merely “accessory” or “complementary” to those of the defendant.
Employment relationship and recognition of co-authorship: potential conflicts
The existence of an employment relationship between the parties, as declared in a previous judgment by the labor court, was not taken into account by the Supreme Court due to a procedural issue: judgments from the labor court are not binding on a civil court. In a sense, the facts and evidence directly presented in the civil proceedings take precedence over the precedents established in the labor court judgment.
That said, it's reasonable to assume that the existence of an employment relationship doesn't prejudge, for better or for worse, the reality of the facts, which can be proven on a case-by-case basis. However, as we will discuss later, the employment contract may explicitly state or emphasize certain conditions or characteristics that contradict the notion that the tasks performed by the assistant or collaborator involve creativity.
Relevance of performing the work alone in determining co-authorship
The fact that the work was created solely by the co-author is yet another circumstance that demonstrates to the court, in the set of all concurrent oneswhich he imprinted on the works or was in a position to imprint his own personality. The capacity for choice is best exercised in solitude.
Obligations of the lead artist after recognition of co-authorship
We are dealing with an essentially declaratory judgment (the attribution to the plaintiff of her status as co-author of the 221 works) which comprises a single condemnatory pronouncement: the defendant must publish an announcement at his own expense in a nationally distributed art magazine with the news that the plaintiff's co-authorship of the 221 works listed in the judgment has been attributed to her.
Impact of the ruling on contemporary artists' workshops: whether they work with collaborators or assistants
Artists' studios represent a constant in the history of art and are not called into question by this legal precedent. The Supreme Court's ruling, in fact, expressly addresses any misinterpretation of its pronouncements and any attempt to extrapolate or generalize its doctrine to the current situation of any artist's studio. On this point, the ruling expressly states: it is not to say that any studio assistant can be considered the author of an artwork in whose execution they participated, but rather that "in this particular case," the plaintiff, in the solitude of the studio, was capable of expressing the plaintiff's ideas, making her own decisions based on her personality.
This does not preclude the possibility of learning from the matter:
- The first is that the artist who works in a workshop setting with collaborators and assistants must make sure to explicitly state in the contract he signs with them the circumstances that emphasize that the creative part, both in the ideation and in the execution of the painting, corresponds to the artist, that the contribution of the collaborators is merely technical and that they lack freedom of choice or criteria for the creation of the work.
- The second is that these contractual principles must be put into practice by the artist in the studio, truly assuming the tasks that concern him beyond their reflection on paper.
- Third, should the matter go to court, the evidence presented at first instance should not be underestimated, nor should contradictions arise, nor should the questioning be conducted with overbearing attitudes. It appears that the witness testimony and the defendant's cross-examination may have played a decisive role in the case.
Consequences of co-authorship on the intellectual authorship of the main artist
From a practical standpoint, it doesn't appear that the ruling will have any further repercussions for the artist, aside from reputational damage. Everything indicates that the paintings were commissioned and had already been sold, so their exploitation has been virtually exhausted.
Furthermore, the artist has not lost his status as author; he simply has to share that status with the plaintiff. In practice, this only means that if the artist wants to refer to those 221 paintings, he would have to acknowledge (state) that the plaintiff is a co-author.
Means of proof that are decisive in accrediting the creative contribution
As we have already noted, it appears that the witness testimony and the defendant's cross-examination were decisive for the Provincial Court in determining how the plaintiff worked in the plaintiff's workshop. These cross-examinations seem to have prevailed over the expert report submitted by the defendant, the content of which is not sufficiently detailed in the judgment.
Can this ruling set a relevant precedent for the recognition of co-authorship in other similar artistic cases?
The sentence does not constitute “jurisprudence"Strictly speaking, it is practically the first of its kind. It is a ruling that relies heavily on the CJEU's doctrine on authorship/originality, and that cites some foreign precedents (the French ruling in the Renoir case). The Supreme Court itself also excludes an expansive interpretation to other cases and emphasizes that its decision is based on the particular circumstances of this case."
But the fact that the Supreme Court sided with the collaborator, rather than the artist, may lead one to think wrongly that the floodgates have opened and that any “assistant"The plaintiff may follow her example. It is necessary to warn against this type of interpretation."
Legal recommendations for artists who work with assistants
Given that the ruling should not cause alarm to anyone, it is advisable that artists who work in a workshop setting with collaborators should take the opportunity to review their contractual situation and, in fact, to ascertain whether or not there is a risk to them arising from the pronouncements of the ruling.
