Judgment of the Court of Justice of December 4, 2025, Mio et al. (C-580/23 and C-795/23).
1. Facts
The ruling addresses two preliminary ruling questions—which were resolved jointly—that had been raised by courts in Sweden and Germany regarding the infringement of intellectual property rights.
In the first of the disputes, Asplund, a company that designs and manufactures home furnishings (in particular the “Palais Royal” dining tables), filed a lawsuit in October 2021 against Mio, a company engaged in the retail sale of furniture and home goods (including the “Cord” dining tables). The plaintiff argued that the “Palais Royal” tables were protected by copyright as works of applied art and that the “Cord” dining tables constituted copyright infringement, as they bore a strong resemblance to its own designs.
Palais Royal Table
Mio denied that the tables in the “Palais Royal” series were protected by copyright, arguing that those tables did not exhibit sufficient originality to qualify for such protection. According to Mio, the design of those tables is based on mere variations of previously known designs or models listed in the European Union’s register of registered designs. In any event, even if the tables in the “Palais Royal” series were protected by copyright, such protection would be limited and restricted, and the differences between the two table designs at issue would, in Mio’s view, be sufficient to demonstrate that Mio’s tables do not infringe copyright.
The claim was upheld at the first instance, and it is the Swedish appellate court that is referring the question for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.
In the second case, the lawsuit was filed by USM, a company that has been manufacturing and marketing a modular furniture system (USM Haller) for decades. This system is characterized by the fact that high-gloss chrome-plated cylindrical tubes are assembled using ball joints to form a frame onto which metal panels of various colors are attached. The structures created in this way can be freely combined and assembled vertically and horizontally.
USM Haller Furniture
For its part, the defendant Konektra offers, through its online store, replacement parts and expansion components for the USM Haller modular furniture system, which correspond to USM components in shape and, for the most part, in color as well. After initially limiting itself to the mere sale of replacement parts—to which USM did not object—Konektra redesigned its online store in 2017. Since 2018, Konektra’s website has listed all the components necessary for the complete assembly of USM Haller furniture and has also advertised these products alongside images of assembled furniture. In addition, Konektra offers its customers an assembly service to put the delivered individual parts together into a complete piece of furniture, and its deliveries include assembly instructions for putting together complete pieces of furniture.
The complaint alleges that by manufacturing, offering, and marketing its own furniture system—which is identical to USM’s—Konektra is infringing on USM’s copyrights in the USM Haller system as a work of applied art or, at the very least, is engaging in unlawful imitation under competition law.
In this case as well, the claim was upheld at the trial court level, but it was the court of cassation that raised the preliminary ruling question.
2. Statements
In the first preliminary ruling, the German Supreme Court asks the Court of Justice whether there is a “rule-exception” relationship between the protection of designs and that of copyright that would require stricter originality requirements to be imposed on works of applied art than on other types of works. The Court of Justice begins by noting that the concept of“work”requires the concurrence of two cumulative elements: originality and sufficient expression. For an object to be considered original, it is both necessary and sufficient that it reflect the personality of its author, expressing his or her free and creative decisions. When the creation of an object is determined by technical considerations, rules, or other requirements that leave no room for the exercise of creative freedom, that object cannot be considered to possess the originality necessary to constitute a work.
The Court of Justice then draws a clear distinction between the criteria applicable to each system of protection, noting that for designs, an objective criterion based on novelty and distinctiveness applies, whereas for copyright, a subjective criterion based on originality applies—understood as a reflection of the author’s personality through free and creative decisions. Three fundamental consequences follow from the foregoing: i) objects protected under a design are not, in principle, comparable to those that constitute works protected by copyright; (ii) there is no automatic link between the grant of protection under design law and the grant of protection under copyright law; and (iii) the requirements for such protection—novelty and distinctiveness, on the one hand, and originality, on the other—must not be confused.
The conclusion reached by the Court of Justice based on this reasoning is that, although the protection afforded to designs and that guaranteed by copyright are not mutually exclusive and may be granted cumulatively to the same object, such cumulation is limited to certain cases. Specifically, it is required that the author have created a unique work bearing the imprint of his or her personality, which, as such, is protected under Directive 2001/29/EC. However, there is no rule-exception relationship between the two forms of protection that would justify imposing stricter requirements on the applied arts.
In the first and second questions referred for a preliminary ruling in Case C-580/23 and the second and third questions referred in Case C-795/23, the referring courts ask the Court of Justice whether, when assessing the originality of works of applied art, factors relating to the creative process and the author’s intentions must be taken into account, or only the elements perceptible in the work itself. They also ask what role additional factors play in that assessment, such as the use of forms from the general repertoire of designs, inspiration drawn from existing objects, the possibility of similar independent creations, or recognition within specialized circles.
The Court of Justice emphasizes that the assessment of originality must be made taking into account the specific nature of the type of works in question. In this regard, in works of applied art, creators’ decisions may be dictated by technical limitations, ergonomic or safety constraints, and industry standards or conventions. However, the Court clarifies that an object that meets the requirement of originality may be protected by copyright, even if its creation was partially determined by technical considerations, provided that such determination did not prevent the author from reflecting his or her personality in the work by expressing free and creative choices. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice establishes a clear limit: components of an object characterized solely by their technical function do not meet the criterion of originality, since copyright protection does not extend to ideas.
It follows from the foregoing that, in the context of copyright, the creative nature of the author’s decisions cannot be presumed. The national court must seek out and identify the creative decisions regarding the form of the work in order to declare it protected. Even when the author has made decisions not dictated by technical or other limitations, the creative nature of those decisions cannot be presumed within the meaning of copyright law.
Finally, the Court of Justice reiterates the statement made in the Cofemel judgment ( Case C-683/17) to the effect that, while artistic or aesthetic considerations come into play in creative activity, the fact that a design produces such an effect does not, in and of itself, allow for a determination of whether that design constitutes an intellectual creation that reflects the author’s freedom of choice and personality and, therefore, qualifies asa “work”protected by copyright. With regard to the possible consideration of the author’s intent during the creative process, the Court recalls that the concept of“work”implies the existence of an object that can be identified with sufficient precision and objectivity. The author’s intentions fall within the realm of ideas and, therefore, can be protected only to the extent that the author has expressed them in the work.
With regard to the weight that should be given to other circumstances when assessing originality, the Court begins by noting that it is incumbent upon the court to take into account all relevant elements of the specific case as they existed at the time the work was conceived, regardless of external factors arising after its creation.
With regard to the use of shapes from the general repertoire of designs, the Court of Justice states that this does not in itself preclude originality. An object composed solely of shapes found in the general repertoire may be original when its author has expressed creative decisions in the arrangement of those shapes. What matters, therefore, is not the novelty of the individual elements, but the originality of their combination or arrangement. As for inspiration drawn from existing objects, the Court distinguishes between two different scenarios. When the object is a“variation”of an existing work by the same author (which is, by definition, original), it may enjoy protection provided that the creative elements incorporated into it remain present and constitute the imprint of that same author’s personality. Conversely, when the authors are different, the work must be considered an “inspired” work—that is, a work that does not reproduce the creative elements of another work verbatim, but rather draws inspiration from them in a different way. This new work may also enjoy protection in its own right, provided that the requirements of originality are met.
With regard to the existence of identical or similar works, the Court of Justice holds that, although copyright law does not establish a requirement of novelty, the creation by another author of similar or identical works prior to the creation of the work for which protection is sought may constitute relevant evidence of a low degree—or even an absence—of originality. However, in the case of works of applied art, the possibility that two authors may have independently made similar or even identical creative decisions cannot be entirely ruled out. Finally, with regard to circumstances such as the presentation of the work at art exhibitions or in museums and its recognition in specialized circles, the CJ is categorical: such circumstances, which are external and subsequent to the creation of the work, are neither necessary nor determinative in and of themselves.
Regarding the questions raised by the Swedish court concerning the criteria applicable to determining the existence of a copyright infringement, the CJEU begins by noting that, in the field of copyright, infringement results from the use of a work without the author’s authorization. Such unauthorized use may constitute an infringement even when it concerns a relatively minor element of the work, provided that that element, in and of itself, embodies the author’s unique intellectual creation. Conversely, for the purposes of assessing whether a copyright infringement has occurred, a comparison of the overall impression produced by each of the conflicting works cannot be decisive, since this criterion pertains to the protection of designs, not to copyright.
The Court of Justice further specifies that, when an object exhibits the characteristics of a work, it must be entitled to copyright protection, without the degree of creative freedom exercised by its author affecting the scope of that protection, which cannot be less than that granted to any original work. The Court adds, specifically regarding utilitarian objects, that the existence of different possible ways to achieve the same technical result—although it indicates the existence of a choice—is not decisive in assessing the factors that guided the decision made by the creator. Similarly, the intent of the alleged infringer is irrelevant for these purposes.
With regard to the existence of a common source of inspiration, the Court of Justice distinguishes between two situations. On the one hand, only the“new”creative elements will be original in the derivative work, and only the reproduction of these new elements will constitute a potential copyright infringement. On the other hand, the mere fact of following the same trend or artistic movement as the author of a prior work does not constitute infringement in the absence of the incorporation of specifically identifiable creative elements from that prior work.
The Court finally addresses the issue of similar independent creation. Although the possibilities for creativity are limited for technical reasons in the case of works of applied art, such a situation cannot be entirely ruled out. If the existence of a similar independent creation is established, it does not constitute a copyright infringement, since the essential element of use or reproduction of the protected work is lacking. The Court concludes with a crucial clarification: the mere possibility of such a situation—that is, the mere theoretical possibility that another author could have independently created a similar object—cannot justify the denial of copyright protection.
3. Comment
There are issues within industrial and intellectual property law that, no matter how deeply they are examined or how many judicial rulings there are, will always remain open to interpretation. Among these, perhaps the most obvious is the distinction between industrial designs and applied works of art.
The fact that a “utility object” can be protected simultaneously under industrial property law and copyright law raises as many questions as it does attractions. The logic or common-sense argument that the industrial design regime is the “natural” sphere for these creations—and that only those with a higher level of creativity deserve the additional protection of copyright—no longer seems sufficient.
La determinación de si el objeto utilitario constituye una <obra> y si goza de “originalidad” debe ser hecha a partir de los criterios específicos de la propiedad intelectual, con el “reflejo de la personalidad del autor” como bandera.
The Court of Justice, which had already ruled on other “utility objects” (folding bicycles, clothing), now adds another (dining tables) to exclude certain criteria, without perhaps fully defining in positive terms the question of when it can be determined that we are dealing with a “reflection of the author’s personality.” As always, it will be up to the court to decide on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the relevant circumstances.
Carlos Morán, Partner in the Legal Department at ELZABURU.